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THE RIGHTS OF MARGIN CUSTOMERS AGAINST WRONGDOING STOCKBROKERS AND SOME OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE MODERN LAW OF

By Edward H. Warren. Published by the Author,
1941. Pp. xv, 464.
PLEDGE.

Professor Warren has written a curious book, not without a
certain literary quality. This is the result of a prose that is lucid
and chaste, an imagery that is unexpected and robust, and something else that calls to mind the adjectives whimsical, meandering, irrelevant and delightful. It proceeds at many different levels. The preface is a sermon on how to write legal prose, and is
undoubtedly intended as a dig at the style of the late Mr. Justice
Cardozo, whose work the book attacks. Some chapters lay out cold
a few legal ABC's and do it in a way that would delight the heart
of any struggling law student. Others are devoted to exacting
legal analysis. There are entertaining excursions into legal historical lore, and occasional wanderings into a type of theorizing
that borders on the sterile; but the latter are conducted in a spirit
of such good fun, in the form of dialogue and otherwise, that they
are wholly welcome.
As a work of legal criticism, the value of the book is limited.
The "center of the center," to use the author's words, is Cardozo's
opinion in Wood v. Fisk,1 containing a very brief discussion of the
rights of margin customers against brokers who wrongfully repledge the securities held. Indeed the book might be described as
a kind of glorified note on this case. With the decision the author
agrees. But the language of the opinion and the use of authorities
are subjected to an attack that is so furious as to provoke irritation in the minds of those who, like the reviewer, have looked
upon the work of Cardozo as one of the brightest spots in American jurisprudence. This irritation, however, is tempered by the
fact that it may be said of Professor Warren, as of one to whom
Holmes referred in a letter to Pollock, that "his bark is worse
than his bile."
The opinion in Wood v. Fisk is held up as representative of a
type of judicial expression that has brought courts into disrespect.
It "seriously impaired the prestige of the New York Court of
Appeals." Up to 1915, one is led to believe, the law of pledge in
New York was clear and sound. Then Cardozo created this "cloud
of dust," after which all was confusion. This is a good deal to
1. 215 N.Y. 233, 109 N.E. 177 (1915).
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charge against a case that admittedly reached the proper result,
that according to Shepard's has been only moderately cited, and
that even at the moment of decision was in part obsolete as authority by reason of a statute passed after the occurrences with
which it was concerned. But it is only when one comes to examine
the specific criticisms that the full extent of the author's hyperbole can be appreciated.
A brief statement of the case is called for. Defendants were
brokers holding shares of stock owned by plaintiff, their customer,
as security for a promissory note. They repledged the shares for
an amount in excess of the customer's indebtedness to them, and
subsequently were adjudicated bankrupts. Plaintiff presented no
claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, but on the maturity of the
note, tendered to defendants the amount of the debt, and brought
an action for conversion of the stock. The question was whether
the discharge in bankruptcy was a defense. It was held that the
wrong of defendants occurred at the time of the repledge, not
upon tender, that the wrong constituted a breach of contract and
the basis of a provable claim. The fact that the damages were not
liquidated at the moment of bankruptcy was immaterial as the
cause of action was then complete. Hence the discharge was a
bar. Nor did the claim fall within the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act excepting from the effect of discharge, liabilities for
"willful and malicious injury to the property of another."
Probably no one would claim that the opinion is an outstanding gem among the many which Cardozo wrote. In connection
with the last point mentioned above, the opinion characterizes the
conversion as "partial and technical," certainly not apt adjectives
for what appears as deliberate and gross misconduct of a kind
which prior to the decision had been stamped as felonious by the
legislature. 2 But defendants converted prior to the passage of the
criminal statute and the holding on this phase of the case is in
accord with the view widely held that only such conversions as
were also crimes fell within this exception of the Bankruptcy
Act.3 The language quoted is doubtless to be attributed to the
instinct of advocacy, prominent throughout Cardozo's work,
which led him, once a decision was reached, to attempt to make
2. It is to be noted that the statute (Penal Law, § 956) makes the repledging of securities a crime only if it results in loss to the customer.
3. It was later held that where the wrongful repledge occurred after the
statute was passed, it came within the exception. Heaphy v. Kerr, 190 App.
Div. 810, 180 N.Y. Supp. 542 (1920), affirmed without opinion 232 N.Y. 526,
134 N.E. 557 (1920).
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out the best possible case for the prevailing side. And, generally
speaking, there are few who would deny that he was a masterful
advocate.
Other criticisms among the "seventeen" which Professor Warren marshals are more trivial. The chief animus is directed against
remarks in the opinion applicable to the first point: "It [the repledge] may have constituted a conversion [citing cases]. It was
unquestionably a breach of contract." The objection is that it is
here left in doubt as to whether the repledge was a conversion.
But the context makes it clear that this was only Cardozo's way
of saying that this was an immaterial point. The opposing argument was that the act of the brokers was a conversion, hence not
the basis for a provable claim. The answer was that this made no
difference, since the repledge gave rise to a ,cause of action for
breach of contract and this was provable in bankruptcy.' The
remainder of the opinion leaves no doubt whatever but that the
act in question was regarded as a conversion.
Another ground of criticism is that the opinion allegedly indicates that nominal damages were appropriate for the tort. A careful reading of the opinion, however, discloses that the references
to nominal damages are primarily in connection with the cause of
action for breach of contract, and this was all that was important.
The argument of plaintiff apparently was that because prior to
the bankruptcy, it could not be known whether damages would
be more than nominal, there was no provable claim. The opinion
admits the premise but denies the conclusion. Since a cause of
action for breach of contract alone was provable, the question of
tort damages was beside the point. Undeniably, however, the tort
and contract theories are intermingled, and the impression is conveyed that if the broker is able to redeem in time, tort as well as
contract damages would be nominal. Since this should be true of
tort damages only if the customer agreed to the return of the
property, there is some basis for criticism. But the point lying.
only on the fringe of the argument, I should say the fault was
venial.
Warmly to be applauded is the stand taken by Professor
Warren for many years against the "custom of the street" which
sanctioned practices that subjected customers to unwarranted
risks of loss by reason of brokerage failures. I find nothing to indi4. The authority for this is Crawford v. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 25 S.Ct. 9,
49 L.Ed. 147 (1904).
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cate that Cardozo was not on his side. Long before Wood v. Fisk,
as the author notes, he had appeared as counsel for the customer
in a case decided by the Appellate Division which had dealt the
"custom of the street" its most serious blow up to that time.,
Fortunately today, by federal legislation and the rules of the.
S.E.C., these practices have been definitely proscribed.
HAROLD C. HAVIGHURST*

CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, by Cecil Thomas Carr.
Columbia University Press, Publishers, New York, 1941. Pp.
ix, 189.
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, by Walter Gellhorn. The
Johns Hopkins Press, Publishers, New York, 1941. Pp. 150.
We have enlarged the area of governmental activity enormously in recent years. We will probably extend it much further
in the immediate future. It is important that we constantly, and
carefully, consider how we are going to regulate the exercise of
power by the men to whom we give it.
Sir Cecil Carr and Mr. Walter Gellhorn are deeply concerned
about this problem. Each. has had extraordinary opportunity to
observe how governmental power is used and how the governed
react to it. For twenty years or more Sir Cecil has been principally.engaged in drafting measures for enactment by the British
Parliament or by British administrative officials. Mr. Gellhorn,
Professor of Administrative Law and Legislation in the Columbia
University Law School, Was in charge of the research staff which
collected data for the United States Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure; this Committee's Final Report.
published in 1941, is by far the most comprehensive and incisive
analysis of administrative law-making and law-enforcing pro1
cedure that we have made in this country.
Each of these books consists of lectures delivered before
American university audiences. They summarize, for their respective countries, the progress which has been made in regulating the exercise of governmental power by administrative offi5. 17 App. Div. 329, 45 N.Y. Supp. 219 (1897).
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.

1. Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure, Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).

